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Curiosity is one of the most basic biological drives in both animals and humans, and
has been identified as a key motive for learning and discovery. Despite the importance
of curiosity and related behaviors, the topic has been largely neglected in human
neuroscience; hence little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying
curiosity. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate what
happens in our brain during the induction and subsequent relief of perceptual curiosity. Our
core findings were that (1) the induction of perceptual curiosity, through the presentation
of ambiguous visual input, activated the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), brain regions sensitive to conflict and arousal; (2) the relief of perceptual curiosity,
through visual disambiguation, activated regions of the striatum that have been related
to reward processing; and (3) the relief of perceptual curiosity was associated with
hippocampal activation and enhanced incidental memory. These findings provide the first
demonstration of the neural basis of human perceptual curiosity. Our results provide
neurobiological support for a classic psychological theory of curiosity, which holds that
curiosity is an aversive condition of increased arousal whose termination is rewarding and
facilitates memory.
Keywords: curiosity, fMRI, arousal, memory, reward processing
INTRODUCTION
Curiosity is a basic biological drive in both animals and humans,
and has been identified as a key motive for learning and discov-
ery. In the 1950s and 1960s, curiosity and related behaviors were
topics of intense investigation among experimental psychologists,
resulting in an extensive theoretical framework for understanding
curiosity and related behaviors (e.g., Berlyne, 1954, 1960, 1966;
Loewenstein, 1994). However, despite the importance of curiosity
in many aspects of behavior, little is known about the neurobi-
ological mechanisms underlying curiosity. In the present study,
we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test
specific predictions of a classic psychological theory of curiosity,
developed by Berlyne (1954). According to this theory, curios-
ity evoked by ambiguous, complex, or conflicting stimuli is an
aversive condition associated with increased levels of arousal. The
theory further holds that termination of this condition, through
access to relevant information, is rewarding and promotes
learning.
We focused on perceptual curiosity, the most basic type of
curiosity that is found in animals as well as humans. One
way to induce perceptual curiosity is to present subjects with
blurred pictures. An early study using this method showed that
blurred pictures evoked longer EEG desynchronization (alpha-
wave blocking) than clear pictures, but only when the identity of
the blurred pictures was unknown, which provides preliminary
evidence that perceptual curiosity causes an increase in arousal
(Berlyne and Borsa, 1968). Another experiment showed that par-
ticipants actively preferred to view the clear version of a preceding
blurred picture over viewing an unrelated clear picture (Nicki,
1970). Importantly, the preference for uncertainty reduction dis-
appeared when participants knew the identity of the blurred
picture. These findings are consistent with the idea that the
reduction of perceptual curiosity is rewarding.
We used a modified version of the blurred pictures paradigm
to investigate the neural underpinnings of both the induction
and the subsequent relief of human perceptual curiosity. More
specifically, we examined whether we could find support at the
neural level for the main assumptions of Berlyne’s theory. First,
the assumption that curiosity is an aversive condition of increased
arousal predicts that the induction of curiosity will produce acti-
vation in brain areas sensitive to autonomic arousal, conflict and
other aversive states. The two brain regions that are typically
activated by a broad range of aversive conditions (including pain,
uncertainty, errors and disgust) are the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011) and the
anterior insular cortex (AIC; Peyron et al., 2000; Singer et al.,
2009); hence we predicted that perceptual curiosity would acti-
vate these regions. Second, the assumption that the reduction of
curiosity is rewarding predicts that this will produce activation in
brain regions involved in reward processing, such as the striatum.
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Third, the assumption that the reduction of curiosity promotes
learning and memory predicts that uncertainty-reducing stim-
uli will be associated with enhanced memory performance and
increased hippocampal activation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen healthy volunteers participated (14 women and five
men; aged 19–29 years; mean age = 22.8 years; SD = 2.4), in
return for C25. All participants gave written consent before par-
ticipation, and the study was approved by the medical ethics
committee of the Leiden University Medical Center. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported to
be right-handed.
TASK DESIGN
Participants were scanned while they viewed sequences of two
pictures of common objects, in a passive-viewing task. To manip-
ulate the induction and reduction of perceptual uncertainty,
we used the following four combinations of clear and blurred
pictures (Figure 1):
1. A blurred picture followed by its corresponding clear picture
(B–Ccorresponding)
2. A blurred picture followed by an unrelated clear picture
(B–Cunrelated)
3. A clear picture followed by its corresponding blurred picture
(C–B)
4. A clear picture followed by an identical picture (C–C).
Entropy, an information-theoretic measure of uncertainty,
increases with the number of possible outcomes and with
the nearness in likelihood of the different possible outcomes
(Shannon, 1948). Berlyne (1965, p. 246) proposed that someone’s
subjective uncertainty about a specific stimulus or event (e.g., the
identity of an object or the solution to a problem) depends in a
FIGURE 1 | Examples of pictures presented in each of the four
conditions. The experiment consisted of 35 trials from each condition,
presented in pseudorandom order.
similar way on the number of alternative hypotheses, and the rel-
ative confidence placed in each hypothesis. A previous behavioral
study using the blurred pictures paradigm has shown that subjec-
tive uncertainty (derived from the number of guesses regarding
the picture’s identity and the relative confidence placed in each
guess) was maximal for pictures with an intermediate degree
of blur (Nicki, 1970). That study also showed that participants’
preference to see the corresponding clear version of a blurred pic-
ture was larger for pictures with an intermediate degree of blur
than for pictures with either a very low or a very high degree
of blur. Based on these findings, we only used blurred pictures
with an intermediate degree of blur (i.e., with maximal subjective
uncertainty).
All pictures were selected from Rossion and Pourtois’ colored
picture databank (Rossion and Pourtois, 2004). This databank is
a set of 260 colored line drawings of objects, provided with norms
for name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and complex-
ity ratings. We selected 140 pictures with perfect name agreement
from this databank. The pictures had a resolution of 71 dpi, and
were centered on a white rectangle of 197 × 281 pixels.We created
a blurred version of each picture bymeans of Gaussian smoothing
with a radius of 20–22 pixels (Adobe Photoshop 5.0; all pictures
can be found at www.sandernieuwenhuis.nl/SOM). By reducing
the picture’s high-frequency components, Gaussian smoothing
acts as a low-pass filter. Results from a behavioral pilot experi-
ment with 49 participants indicated that the objects displayed in
the blurred pictures could not be identified by the majority of the
participants.
On each trial, a sequence of two pictures was presented. The
pictures were projected onto a screen and viewed through amirror
attached to the head coil of the scanner. Eachpicturewas presented
for 5 s in the middle of the screen on a white background, and
was surrounded by a black frame (visual angle = 18.5 × 13.8◦).
The two pictures in a trial were separated by a 500ms interval
during which only the frame was presented. The intertrial interval
varied between 1 and 9 s (uniform distribution). The experiment
consisted of 35 trials from each of four conditions illustrated
in Figure 1, presented in pseudorandom order. For the blurred
pictures in the B–Cunrelated condition we used blurred versions of
35 additional pictures from Rossion and Pourtois’ databank (i.e.,
pictures of which the clear version was not used). The 140 clear
pictures were presented in the same order for all participants. To
exclude thepossibility thatdifferencesbetween theconditionswere
caused by picture-specific effects, we divided the 140 clear pictures
into four subsets of 35 pictures with comparable familiarity,
complexity and imagery ratings (all ps > 0.86) and alternated
the coupling of the four picture subsets to the four conditions
across participants according to a balanced Latin-square design.
The experiment was divided into five runs of 28 trials between
which we stopped the scanner to verify that the participant was
still attending to the pictures. Each run contained seven trials
from each condition and lasted approximately 8min. Participants
were not aware of the aim of the study; we told participants that
the experiment was designed to investigate the brain activation
associated with the perceptual processing of clear and blurred
pictures, and informed them of the four possible ways in which
clear and blurred pictures could be combined.
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After completing the experiment, participants were given an
unexpected free-recall test outside the scanner; they were asked
to type in the names of as many objects as they could recall from
the pictures they had seen in the scanner. Subsequently, partici-
pants were asked to indicate, on a five-point scale (1= not at all;
5= very much), the degree to which they had (1) been curious
about the blurred pictures; (2) tried to guess the identity of the
objects depicted on the blurred pictures; (3) been disappointed
when a blurred picture was not followed by the corresponding
clear version; (4) recognized the objects depicted on the blurred
pictures; and (5) tried to remember the pictures. Finally, par-
ticipants completed the perceptual curiosity scale (Collins et al.,
2004).
IMAGE ACQUISITION
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a
3-T Philips Achieva MRI system (Best, The Netherlands). In each
of the five functional runs, 210 T2∗-weighted whole-brain EPIs
were acquired (TR = 2.2 s; TE= 30ms, flip angle = 80, 38 axial
slices, 2.75 × 2.75 × 2.75mm + 10% interslice gap). In addition,
a high-resolution EPI scan and a T1-weighted anatomical scan
were obtained for registration purposes (EPI scan: TR = 2.2ms;
TE = 30ms, flip angle = 80◦, 84 axial slices, 1.96 × 1.96 × 2mm;
3D T1-weighted scan: TR = 9.7ms; TE = 4.6ms, flip angle = 8◦,
140 axial slices, 0.88 × 0.88 × 1.2mm).
IMAGE ANALYSIS
MRI data analysis was carried out using FMRI Expert Analysis
Tool (FEAT) version 5.98, which is part of FMRIB’s Software
Library (FSL; Smith et al., 2004). Image pre-processing consisted
of motion correction (Jenkinson et al., 2002), non-brain removal
(Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing using an 8mm full-width at
half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel, grand-mean intensity
normalization of the entire 4D data set by a single multiplicative
factor, and high-pass temporal filtering to remove low-frequency
artifacts (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting,
with sigma = 100 s). Functional scans were registered to high-
resolution EPI images, which were registered to T1 images, which
were registered to standard MNI space (Jenkinson and Smith,
2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002).
The fMRI time series were analyzed using an event-related
approach in the context of a general linear model with local auto-
correlation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001). We constructed
six explanatory variables of interest: two for the first picture in
a trial (Blurred or Clear), and four for the second picture in
a trial (Clear-corresponding, Clear-unrelated, Clear-double, or
Blurred). Each explanatory variable was time-locked to the pic-
ture onset and had a duration of 5 s (i.e., the entire duration of
the picture presentation). The hemodynamic response to each
event was estimated by convolving each explanatory variable with
a canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal
derivative. The model was high-pass-filtered (Gaussian-weighted
least-squares straight line fitting, sigma = 100 s).
For each run, in each participant, we assessed several contrasts
(see Results section). The contrasts were combined across the
five runs on a subject-by-subject basis using fixed-effects analyses
(Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich et al., 2004). These second-level
contrast images were submitted to third-level mixed-effects group
analyses (Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich et al., 2004).
Region-of-interest analyses
We conducted region-of-interest (ROI) analyses to test the pre-
dicted AIC and ACC activation in response to the induction of
perceptual uncertainty, and the predicted striatal and hippocam-
pal activation in response to the relief of perceptual uncertainty.
We used anatomical ROIs of the bilateral insular cortex, ACC
(comprised of the anterior cingulate and paracingulate gyrus;
Fornito et al., 2006), striatum (comprised of the caudate, puta-
men and nucleus accumbens), and hippocampus, as specified
by the Harvard–Oxford subcortical structural atlas, and imple-
mented in FSLView version 3.1.2. Only the voxels that were part
of these areas with a probability of at least 50% were included
in the ROIs. The statistical parametric images were thresholded
using clusters determined by Z > 2.3 and a cluster-corrected
significance threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley, 2001). To further
examine the hippocampal activation, we extracted the average
time course of the hemodynamic response function in response
to the second picture in each of the four conditions using PEATE
(perl event-related average time course extraction), a companion
tool to FSL (http://www.jonaskaplan.com/peate/peate-tk.html).
Time courses were extracted from the hippocampal activation
clusters of the curiosity-relief contrast (i.e., the regions with
stronger activation in response to the second picture in the
B–Ccorresponding condition than in response to the second picture
in the B–Cunrelated condition).
To examine whether individual differences in trait-perceptual
curiosity and free-recall performance were predictive of individ-
ual differences in brain activation, we extracted each participant’s
peak z value from the activation clusters of interest. We correlated
these peak z values with participants’ scores on the perceptual
curiosity questionnaire and with their free-recall performance. In
addition, we computed the across-subject correlations between
the peak z values of the different activation clusters of interest.
Disappointment median-split analysis
To examine whether participants’ rated disappointment when
the identity of a blurred object was not revealed predicted the
strength of their ACC/AIC activation in response to perceptual
uncertainty, we divided all participants into two groups based on
their disappointment ratings: nine participants reported a strong
disappointment (ratings of 4 or 5 on a five-point scale) and
the other ten participants reported less disappointment (ratings
of 2 or 3). We used a t-test to determine whether the high-
disappointment group showed stronger ACC/AIC activation in
response to perceptual uncertainty than the low-disappointment
group.
Whole-brain analyses
In addition to the ROI analyses, we conducted exploratory whole-
brain analyses to examine the activation of brain areas outside our
ROIs in response to induction and/or relief of perceptual uncer-
tainty. In these analyses, statistical parametric images for each
contrast were thresholded at p < 0.001, with a minimum cluster
size of 26 MNI voxels (208mm3).
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Table 1 | Participants’ ratings of the degree to which they had been
curious about the blurred pictures, recognized the blurred pictures,
and had tried to remember the pictures (means ± standard
deviations).
I was curious about the blurred pictures 4.11 ± 0.88
I tried to guess the identity of the objects depicted in the
blurred pictures
4.53 ± 0.70
I was disappointed when a blurred picture was not
followed by its clear version
3.16 ± 1.02
I recognized the objects depicted in the blurred pictures 2.79 ± 0.92
I tried to remember the pictures 1.74± 0.73
All ratings were on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
RESULTS
We scanned 19 healthy participants while they viewed sequences
of two pictures, in a passive-viewing task (Figure 1). Our task
design resulted in the induction of perceptual uncertainty by
the first picture on half of the trials (the B–Ccorresponding and
B–Cunrelated conditions), which was resolved by the second pic-
ture on half of these trials (the B–Ccorresponding condition).
Participants’ ratings after the scanning session indicated that they
had indeed been curious about the blurred pictures (Table 1).
FREE-RECALL PERFORMANCE
The number of pictures that participants recalled in an unex-
pected free-recall test after the scan session was significantly
affected by the condition in which the pictures had been presented
[F(3,54) = 11.5, p < 0.001]. Participants recalled more pictures
from the B–Ccorresponding condition (mean = 10.4, SD = 4.8)
than pictures from the B–Cunrelated (mean = 6.1, SD = 3.7),C–C
(mean = 7.3, SD = 3.8) and C–B (mean = 8.0, SD = 4.4) condi-
tions (all ps < 0.03). Thus, incidental memory for uncertainty-
reducing stimuli was enhanced. In addition, participants recalled
fewer pictures from the B–Cunrelated condition than from the
C–C and C–B conditions (ps < 0.04). The number of pic-
tures recalled from the C–C and C–B conditions did not differ
(p = 0.28).
BRAIN ACTIVATION ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY
To examine the brain activation associated with perceptual uncer-
tainty, we focused on the neural response to the first picture
in each trial, and identified brain regions where activation was
larger when the picture was blurred compared to clear. Our ROI
analyses of the ACC and insular cortex revealed significant acti-
vation in the ACC (one cluster extending into both hemispheres)
and the right AIC (Figure 2, upper panel; Table 2, upper part).
Functional-connectivity studies have suggested that the AIC and
AAC are part of a putative “salience network” (Seeley et al., 2007),
which has been associated with autonomic arousal (Critchley,
2005) and various aversive emotional experiences (e.g., Craig
et al., 1996; Ploghaus et al., 1999; Eisenberger et al., 2003).
The whole-brain analysis for this contrast also revealed activa-
tion in the bilateral AIC and ACC, as well as activation in regions
of the inferior frontal gyrus, frontal pole, lingual gyrus, occipital
pole and posterior cingulate gyrus (Table 3).
A whole-brain analysis (cluster-corrected, p < 0.05) of the
opposite contrast, which identified brain regions that were more
FIGURE 2 | ACC/AIC activation associated with perceptual uncertainty.
Upper panel: The colored regions were more active when the first picture
in a trial was blurred (i.e., the first pictures in the B–Ccorresponding and
B–Cunrelated conditions) than when it was clear (i.e., the first pictures
in the C–C and C–B conditions). R = right; L = left; ACC = anterior
cingulate cortex; AIC = anterior insular cortex. The displayed activations
are the cluster-corrected Z statistic maps (p < 0.05) from the ACC/AIC
ROI analyses. Lower panel: The colored regions were deactivated when
the first picture in a trial was blurred compared to when it was clear.
The displayed activations are whole-brain cluster-corrected Z statistic
maps (p < 0.05). All activations are overlaid onto the standard MNI
brain.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 5 | 4
Jepma et al. Curiosity and the brain
Table 2 | Activation clusters from the ROI analyses.
Region Left/Right Cluster size (mm3) ZMAX MNI peak coordinates (mm)
x y z
PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY: FIRST PICTURE BLURRED > FIRST PICTURE CLEAR
Anterior insular cortex R 800 4.27 34 22 −4
Anterior cingulate cortex R/L 3152 3.95 8 28 38
RELIEF OF PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY: SECOND PICTURE IN B–CCORRESPONDING CONDITION > SECOND PICTURE
IN B–CUNRELATED CONDITION
Striatum L 2672 3.26 −12 6 10
Hippocampus R 664 2.93 28 −12 −22
Hippocampus L 1008 3.08 −26 −16 −14
Table 3 | All brain regions that were activated in response to perceptual uncertainty (upper part) and in response to the relief of uncertainty
(lower part).
Region Left/Right Cluster size (mm3) ZMAX MNI peak coordinates (mm)
x y z
PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY: FIRST PICTURE BLURRED > FIRST PICTURE CLEAR
Anterior insular cortex R 3192 4.32 36 24 −4
Anterior insular cortex L 1152 4.11 −28 22 −4
Anterior cingulate cortex R 1464 4.13 10 24 48
Anterior cingulate cortex L 488 3.45 −6 12 44
Inferior frontal gyrus R 3240 4.00 50 16 26
Frontal pole R 424 3.51 32 48 8
Lingual gyrus R/L 5520 4.09 8 −80 −8
Occipital pole L 912 4.21 −12 −94 10
Posterior cingulate gyrus R/L 616 3.91 2 −30 24
RELIEF OF PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY: SECOND PICTURE IN B–CCORRESPONDING CONDITION > SECOND PICTURE
IN B–CUNRELATED CONDITION
Caudate (dorsal striatum) L 224 3.26 −12 6 10
Putamen (dorsal striatum) R 600 3.55 30 −20 10
Orbitofrontal cortex L 624 3.54 −28 6 −12
(extending into
ventral putamen and
insular cortex)
Lateral occipital cortex R/L 1808 3.46 40 −74 0
Posterior insula R 456 3.57 42 −4 6
Data are thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with a minimum cluster size of 26 contiguous MNI voxels.
activated by clear pictures than by blurred pictures, revealed
activation in a set of brain regions that have been associated
with the “default-mode network” (Figure 2, lower panel). The
default-mode network, which includes regions of the precuneus,
posterior lateral parieto-occipital cortex and medial prefrontal
cortex, is typically stronger activated during rest than during cog-
nitive effort (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001). The relative deactivation
of this network in response to blurred compared to clear pictures
suggests that participants actively processed the blurred pictures.
Consistent with this interpretation, participants indicated that
they had been curious about the blurred pictures, had tried to
guess the identities of the objects depicted in them, and had been
rather disappointed when a blurred picture was not followed by
its corresponding clear version (Table 1).
Several findings suggest that the AIC/ACC activation reflected
a neural substrate of a negative arousal state associated with
perceptual curiosity. First, the activated regions of the AIC and
ACC closely overlap with areas that are typically activated in
response to errors, negative feedback and other aversive events
(Ullsperger et al., 2010). Second, the strength of participants’
AIC activation was positively correlated with their trait curios-
ity as indexed by the perceptual curiosity questionnaire (r = 0.54,
p = 0.02; Figure 3). Third, the participants who reported more
disappointment when the identity of a blurred picture was not
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FIGURE 3 | The individual participants’ peak activation (z value) for the
perceptual-uncertainty contrast in the right AIC plotted against their
perceptual curiosity score.
revealed showed stronger ACC activation than the participants
who reported less disappointment [t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.04; see
Section “Disappointment median-split analysis”].
Interestingly, the strength of participants’ ACC activation asso-
ciated with perceptual uncertainty was predictive of the number
of pictures they later recalled from the B–Ccorresponding condi-
tion (r = 0.51, p = 0.03; there was also a trend for a positive
correlation between the numbers of pictures recalled from the
B–Ccorresponding condition and the AIC activation, p = 0.075), but
not of the number of pictures they recalled from the other con-
ditions (all ps > 0.28). This suggests that the uncertainty-related
activation of the ACC contributed to the enhanced memory for
stimuli that reduced this uncertainty.
BRAIN ACTIVATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE RELIEF OF
PERCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY
To examine the brain activation associated with the relief of per-
ceptual uncertainty, we created a contrast that identified brain
regions where activation was larger in response to the sec-
ond picture in the B–Ccorresponding condition than in response
to the second picture in the B–Cunrelated condition. Our ROI
analysis of the striatum revealed a significant cluster of acti-
vation that encompassed regions of the left caudate, putamen
and nucleus accumbens (Figure 4; Table 2, lower part). These
activated areas have been associated with reward processing,
the coding of “reward-prediction errors” (i.e., the difference
between actual and expected reward) and reinforcement learn-
ing (O’Doherty, 2004; Daw and Doya, 2006; Haruno and Kawato,
2006). Since the uncertainty induced by a blurred picture was
relieved by the following picture on only half of the trials, the
reduction of perceptual uncertainty by the second picture pos-
sibly caused a (partial) reward-prediction error. Accordingly,
the striatal activation could reflect the reward value and/or the
reward-prediction error associated with the relief of perceptual
uncertainty.
Confirming predictions, the ROI analysis of the hippocam-
pus revealed that regions of the bilateral hippocampus showed
stronger activation in response to the second picture in the
FIGURE 4 | Striatal activation associated with the reduction of
perceptual uncertainty. The colored regions were more active when the
second picture in a trial reduced the perceptual uncertainty induced by the
preceding picture (i.e., the second picture in the B–Ccorresponding condition)
than when the second picture did not reduce the perceptual uncertainty
induced by the preceding picture (i.e., the second picture in the B–Cunrelated
condition). R, right; L, left. The displayed activations are the
cluster-corrected Z statistic maps (p < 0.05) from the striatal ROI analysis,
which were overlaid onto the standard MNI brain.
B–Ccorresponding than in the B–Cunrelated condition (Figure 5). A
contrast that identified brain regions where activation was larger
in response to the second picture in the B–Ccorresponding condi-
tion than in the C–C condition also revealed significant activation
in the bilateral hippocampus (512 and 88mm3 in the left and
right hippocampus, respectively). The event-related time courses
of the BOLD signal in response to the second picture in each of
the four conditions illustrate the specific increase in hippocam-
pal activation for the B–Ccorresponding condition (Figure 5). The
increased hippocampal activation in response to uncertainty-
reducing stimuli likely underlied the enhanced later recall of these
stimuli. Interestingly, the strength of participants’ hippocam-
pal activation in response to the reduction of uncertainty was
positively correlated with the strength of their AIC activation
in response to the induction of uncertainty (r = 0.57, p = 0.01
and r = 0.53, p = 0.02 for the left and the right hippocampus,
respectively).
The whole-brain analysis for this contrast also revealed stri-
atal activation, as well as activation of the lateral occipital cortex,
orbitofrontal cortex and posterior insula (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The present results provide the first demonstration of the neu-
robiological basis of human perceptual curiosity. By elucidating
the neural underpinnings of the induction and relief of percep-
tual curiosity, our study extends existing behavioral accounts of
curiosity. In particular, our results are consistent with Berlyne’s
classic psychological theory of curiosity (Berlyne, 1954, 1960,
1966). First, our finding that perceptual uncertainty activated
brain regions sensitive to arousal and conflict supports the
assumption that curiosity evoked by ambiguous stimuli is an
aversive condition, and induces an increase in arousal. Second,
our finding that the reduction of perceptual uncertainty acti-
vated striatal regions involved in reward processing supports
the assumption that the termination of this condition, through
access to relevant information, is rewarding. Third, our findings
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FIGURE 5 | Hippocampal activation associated with the reduction of
perceptual uncertainty. Upper panel: the colored regions were more active
when the second picture in a trial reduced the perceptual uncertainty induced
by the preceding picture (i.e., the second picture in the B–Ccorresponding
condition) than when the second picture did not reduce the perceptual
uncertainty induced by the preceding picture (i.e., the second picture in the
B–Cunrelated condition). The displayed activations are the cluster-corrected Z
statistic maps from the hippocampal ROI analysis (p < 0.05) overlaid onto the
standard MNI brain. Lower panel: Time course of hemodynamic activity in
response to the second picture in each of the four conditions. Time courses
were extracted from the hippocampal activation clusters shown in the upper
panel.
that the reduction of perceptual uncertainty was associated with
increased hippocampal activation and enhanced incidental mem-
ory support the assumption that uncertainty reduction facilitates
memory and learning.
Our findings are also consistent with Loewenstein’s infor-
mation-gap account of curiosity which proposes that curiosity is
a negative feeling of deprivation that is caused by an inconsis-
tency, or gap, between one’s actual and aspired level of knowledge
(Loewenstein, 1994; see Litman et al., 2005, for empirical tests
and a more detailed investigation of this theory). Since people
differ in their aspired level of knowledge, the same actual level
of knowledge will evoke curiosity in some people but not in oth-
ers. In line with this idea, we found that inter-individual variation
in trait perceptual curiosity correlated with the strength of AIC
activation in response to perceptual uncertainty, suggesting that
people with a higher level of aspired perceptual knowledge experi-
ence stronger negative feelings when confronted with ambiguous
perceptual input.
The relief of perceptual curiosity was associated with activa-
tion in regions of the striatum (left caudate, putamen and nucleus
accumbens) involved in reward processing, which is consistent
with the idea that curiosity reduction is rewarding. This idea is
consistent with previous behavioral findings that people actively
prefer to view the clear version of a preceding blurred picture
over viewing an unrelated clear picture (Nicki, 1970). Other work
has shown that people have a similar preference for exploring
perceptually novel over familiar stimuli, a tendency that is also
associated with striatal activation (Wittmann et al., 2008). In
the reinforcement-learning literature, this bias towards the explo-
ration of uncertain or novel options is captured by the concept
of an “exploration bonus” that is assigned to uncertain or novel
stimuli to promote their exploration (Kakade and Dayan, 2002).
The relief of perceptual curiosity was also associated with
enhanced incidental memory, and with increased hippocampal
activation, a plausible neural substrate underlying the behav-
ioral memory effect. The finding that curiosity reduction leads
to enhanced memory suggests that inducing people’s curiosity
before presenting them with teaching material (e.g., by asking
people to guess the meaning of foreign words before showing
them the translations) can facilitate learning.
Because the AIC and ACC are the two brain regions that are
typically activated by aversive conditions, and the striatum plays
a key role in reward processing, our fMRI results are consistent
with our predictions that curiosity is an aversive state whose ter-
mination is rewarding. However, it is important to note that the
AIC/ACC and the striatum are also involved in cognitive processes
that are unrelated to aversive states and rewards, respectively.
Due to the non-specificity of the function of these brain areas,
it is possible that the activations we found reflected processes
other than those predicted by Berlyne’s theory; hence our findings
do not provide persuasive evidence for that theory. Indeed, our
method of inferring the presence of particular cognitive/affective
processes from the activation of particular brain regions is
an example of “reverse inference” (Poldrack, 2006). Although
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this method is not deductively valid, it can provide interesting
hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms of relatively unex-
plored conditions, such as curiosity, which can then be tested
in subsequent studies. Thus, our study should be seen as a first
demonstration of the neural correlates of perceptual curiosity, of
which the results are consistent with but do not provide unequiv-
ocal evidence for Berlyne’s theory. Future studies testing more
specific predictions are necessary to either confirm or reject our
interpretation of the curiosity-related brain activation.
Curiosity is a multifaceted construct, and several different
types of curiosity can be distinguished. One important distinc-
tion is the difference between perceptual and epistemic curiosity.
Perceptual curiosity is aroused by novel, strange or ambiguous
stimuli, whereas epistemic curiosity refers to the desire for knowl-
edge or intellectual information which applies mainly to humans
(Berlyne, 1954). Another, orthogonal, distinction can be made
between specific and diversive curiosity, referring to the desire
for a particular piece of information versus the more general
stimulation-seeking motive that is closely related to boredom
(Berlyne, 1960; see Litman, 2008, for a related distinction). The
type of curiosity that we investigated in the present study can be
referred to as specific perceptual curiosity, one of the most basic
types of curiosity that applies to both animals and humans. The
neural substrates of specific epistemic curiosity evoked by trivia
questions was investigated recently (Kang et al., 2009). Kang et al.
found that questions that were rated as more puzzling were asso-
ciated with stronger activation in regions of the caudate. However,
since the questions were always followed by their correct answers,
it was unclear whether this activation reflected uncertainty about
the correct answer, feedback anticipation, or a combination of the
two. In our study, the uncertainty induced by blurred pictures
was often not relieved, which allowed examination of the neural
correlates of pure curiosity unconfounded by the anticipation of
uncertainty-reducing feedback. In addition, by comparing condi-
tions in which the second picture did vs. did not reduce perceptual
uncertainty, we could separately isolate the neural correlates of the
relief of curiosity.
We did not ask participants to rate their curiosity on each trial
since we were concerned that this would confound the brain acti-
vation reflecting their natural curiosity. Therefore, a limitation
of our study is that we could not take into account trial-to-trial
variation in experienced curiosity. In addition, it must be noted
that the blurred pictures in our study were associated with both
perceptual uncertainty and outcome uncertainty, since the iden-
tity of the blurred image was revealed in only half of the trials.
Thus, participants may have experienced uncertainty not only
about the identity of the image, but also about whether or not
the identity of the image would be resolved. Both forms of uncer-
tainty are likely to increase overall curiosity, but future studies in
which these two forms of uncertainty are manipulated indepen-
dently are needed to assess their respective contributions to brain
activation. Finally, it is likely that curiosity reduction through pas-
sive exposure to uncertainty-reducing stimuli, as examined in the
present study, differs from curiosity reduction that is achieved
through active exploration. A recent study showed that hip-
pocampus activation was stronger when people had volitional
control over the visual exploration of pictures in a visual-learning
task than when they received exactly the same visual information
in a passive condition (Voss et al., 2011). This suggests that the
hippocampus activation associated with uncertainty reduction
that we found in the present study would have been even stronger
if participants would have had the opportunity to actively control
the exploration of uncertainty-inducing stimuli.
To conclude, our results provide the first demonstration of
the neural correlates of human perceptual curiosity, and are con-
sistent with the assumptions of Berlyne’s theory that perceptual
curiosity evokes an aversive state of increased arousal, whose ter-
mination is rewarding and promotes incidental memory. Because
curiosity plays a key role in many aspects of human behavior,
a better understanding of the psychological and neurobiological
basis of curiosity may have considerable practical implications
for various societal objectives. Together with previous behavioral
findings (Berlyne and Normore, 1972), our results suggest that
inventing ways to arouse people’s curiosity could contribute to the
optimization of educational systems and advertising strategies,
and may promote scientific discovery.
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